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Making Comparative Criminal Law Possible
EINFUHRUNG IN DAS US-AMERIKANISCHE STRAFRECHT. By
Markus Dirk Dubber. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005. Pp. xvii,
216. E19.80.
LUTZ EIDAMt
Today there can be little doubt that criminal law has
internationally more in common than one might expect at
first sight.' That is why-despite a hesitant development in
the last century-international studies, even in the field of
criminal law, become more and more common. And this is
the right way to go, considering that each and every
national criminal law system has to deal with similar legal
aspects and problems. So why not direct one's view abroad
to see how certain aspects are handled there?
German criminal law science, long the dominant body
of criminal law scholarship in the civil law world, 2 is
already following such an approach. Comparative studies
are conducted with a number of other European, Scandina-
vian, South American, and Asian nations. 3 By contrast, a
t Research Assistant and Lecturer in Law, University of Frankfurt, School of
Law, Germany.
1. Cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAw (1998).
2. E.g., Markus D. Dubber, The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science
of Crime and Punishment, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1049 (2005), http://www.german
lawjournal.comarticle.php?id=613.
3. See, e.g., WINFRIED HASSEMER & FRANCISCO MUNOZ CONDE, INTRODUCCI6N
A LA CRIMINOLOGiA Y AL DERECHO PENAL (1989). This book is an attempt by a
German and a Spanish author to transfer a German approach into the system
of Spanish criminal law. Recently, the German criminal law scholar Claus
Roxin emphasized in the preface of the newest edition of his famous textbook 1
STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL (4th ed. 2006) that he felt compelled by the
growing international cooperation in the field of criminal law to include and cite
international literature (for the first time). It is also worth mentioning that
several German criminal law textbooks have been translated into different
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scientific exchange with the United States and its criminal
law system barely exists. Most Europeans think of
American criminal law only in its extremes, such as the
death penalty, habitual offender laws (notably the infamous
three strikes laws),4 and the practice of plea bargaining,
which seems to conflict with very basic rules of criminal
procedure. 5 Alas, this perception focuses on a few highly
languages. See, e.g., HANS WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT (11th ed. 1969)
(translated into Spanish, Italian, Korean, Japanese and Greek); JOHANNES
WESSELS & WERNER BEULKE, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL (35th ed. 2005)
(translated into Portuguese, Spanish and Korean). However, it seems that
foreign countries are more interested in the German criminal law system than
German scholars are in other nations' criminal law, since there are hardly any
translations available of foreign criminal law textbooks. Note also that South
American Courts occasionally cite German literature in criminal cases. A
striking example is a recent opinion by Colombia's Corte Constitucional, which
cites a host of German criminal law scholars, including Hassemer, Roxin,
Jakobs, Welzel, Binding, Maurach, Zipf, and Otto. See Sentencia C-333/01 (Mar.
29, 2001), available at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/SC333_01.htm.
(I am indebted to Carmen Ruiz for this reference). The German Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), by contrast, tends to stick to German
literature in criminal cases.
An important center of comparative criminal law research in Germany is the
Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg.
See Max-Planck-Institut, http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/iuscrim.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2005).
4. Cf. Lutz Eidam, Mentally Retarded Offenders and the Death Penalty: The
Latest Supreme Court Ruling and Possible European Influences, 4 GERMAN L.J.
493 (2003), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=272; Ulrike
Grasberger, Three Strikes and You Are Out, 110 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAyr [ZStW] 796 (1998) (F.R.G.); Wanja A. Welke,
Mandatory Sentencing, 2002 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 207
(F.R.G.); Brunhild Wiek, Wider aller Vernunft: Die Todesstrafe in den
Vereinigten Staaten, 1990 MONATSSCHRIFI FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT [MDR] 113
(F.R.G.). Another issue Germans and Europeans in general tend to emphasize
with regard to American criminal law is the prison population explosion. Cf.
Katja Gelinsky, Keine Strafe ohne Geld: Amerika kann sich seine Gefdngnisse
nicht mehr leisten, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (F.R.G.), Feb. 9, 2004, at
31. On harsh sentencing in the United States, see Uwe Buse, Lebenslang,
immer wieder: Warum in den USA ein Dieb hdrter als viele Morder bestraft
wurde, 25 DER SPIEGEL 60 (2005) (F.R.G.).
5. E.g., Toni M Massaro, Das amerikanische Plea-Bargaining System:
Staatsanwaltschaftliches Ermessen bei der Strafverfolgung, 1989
STRAFVERTEIDIGER [StV] 454 (F.R.G.); Thomas Weigend, Strafzumessung durch
die Parteien: Das Verfahren des plea bargaining im amerikanischen Recht, 94
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFr [ZStW] 200 (1982)
(F.R.G.). Also, Bernd Schunemann, Absprachen im Strafverfahren? Grundlagen,
Gegenstdnde und Grenzen, 58 DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG 104 (1990) (F.R.G.) calls
the American system a "guilty plea enforcement machine." For a comparative
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selective issues in American criminal law while leaving its
doctrinal system totally unattended.
In his Einfiihrung in das US-amerikanische Strafrecht
("Introduction to U.S.-American Criminal Law"), Markus
Dubber tries to replace this narrow and piece-meal
European view of American criminal law with a comprehen-
sive approach. It is the first book on the general principles
of American criminal law written in German, and as a
result, is poised to shape German thinking on American
criminal law for some time to come.
A first look at the table of contents of the book reveals
that the book's structure resembles that of textbooks on
general German criminal law, thus making it readily
accessible to German scholars and students while, at the
same time, highlighting some basic structural similarities
between American and German criminal law. Dubber's
book follows the three-step analysis scheme for criminal
liability, which includes chapters on the prerequisites of
criminality (Handlung and Tatbestandsmdi3igkeit), as well
as issues concerning justification (Rechtfertigung) and
excuse (Entschuldigung).6 Such an approach to criminal
liability is-even today-not universally followed in the
United States considering the traditional English common
law used a two-step analysis, which roughly distinguished
between offenses (themselves constituted of actus reus and
mens rea) and defenses.7  As Dubber demonstrates,
however, the influential Model Penal Code (MPC) recog-
nizes three levels of criminal liability that parallel those
familiar with German criminal law.
The book's emphasis on the MPC (published by the
American Law Institute in 1962) initially comes as a
surprise to a German reader eager to learn something
about contemporary American criminal law, considering
perspective, see Markus D. Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay
Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1997).
6. For an English-language overview of the German system for analyzing
criminal liability, see Wolfgang Naucke, An Insider's Perspective on the
Significance of the German Criminal Law Theory's General System for
Analyzing Criminal Acts, 1984 BYU L. REV. 305. See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 575-78 (1978).
7. On the differentiation between justification and excuse, see the
comparative work of Winfried Hassemer, Justification and Excuse in Criminal
Law: Theses and Comments, 1986 BYU L. REV. 573.
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that the MPC is merely a model piece of legislation that
never came into force in toto. But after Dubber's first
chapter, the reason he focused on the MPC becomes quite
clear. Since the criminal law of the fifty-two jurisdictions in
the United States (including the District of Columbia as
well as federal criminal law, found in the Federal Criminal
Code-Title 18 of the U.S. Code-and other federal
statutes) had become increasingly complex and confusing,
particularly in the first half of the twentieth century, the
code attempted to systematize and thus simplify American
criminal law. Moreover, at least forty of the fifty states took
the MPC as a model to reform their criminal codes, and
courts all over the United States (including the U.S.
Supreme Court) consult the MPC to address difficult
doctrinal problems.8
The decision to focus on the MPC analysis also makes
the book accessible to readers from the civil law tradition in
general and German readers in particular. As already
mentioned, the MPC's overall structure generally resembles
the three-part analysis of criminal liability familiar to
criminal lawyers outside the common law tradition.
Moreover, the very fact that the Code is a code, and there-
fore represents a comprehensive statement of the basic
principles of criminal law, facilitates comparative analysis
by readers who have long grown accustomed to conceiving
of criminal law both as a statutory subject, rather than one
that evolves over time through judicial opinions, and as a
conceptually sophisticated and highly developed area of
law.
Besides setting out the basic ideas underlying the MPC,
the first chapter also introduces the reader to important
notions of American criminal law. Among them, for in-
stance, is the American understanding of "legality" (which
differs substantially from the German Legal itdtsprinzip, or
principle of compulsory prosecution9 ), the rise and fall of
8. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, EINFUHRUNG IN DAS US-AMERIKANISCHE
STRAFRECHT 16 (2005).
9. For an English language discussion of the German Legalitcitsprinzip
compare NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 341-42
(3d ed. 2003) and THOMAS WEIGEND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
187, 210 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). For an introduction to the understanding
of "legality" in different criminal law systems in general, compare FLETCHER,
238 [Vol. 54
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judge-defined "common law crimes" in the United States,
the prevalent theories of punishment in American criminal
law, and the American understanding of criminal harm and
of the legal goods or interests that are meant to be
protected by the criminal law. Before chapter one, Dubber
helpfully summarizes the American method of legal cita-
tion, which will be appreciated by foreign readers who wish
to follow up the numerous references to primary and
secondary sources in the book.
Next, Dubber delves into the depths of the doctrinal
rules of modern American criminal law, as illustrated by
the MPC's general part. Following the three-step analysis of
criminal liability, chapter two deals with all the issues a
German lawyer would assemble under the legal term
Tat bestandsm/lJigkeit (prerequisites of the criminal of-
fense). The chapter deals with the different forms of actus
reus (commission, omission, possession) and related issues
(complicity, causation, inchoate offenses). Also, it discusses
in considerable detail problems associated with the concept
of mens rea, including the MPC's differentiated and highly
influential scheme of modes of culpability (purpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness, negligence), strict liability, and intoxica-
tion and mistake as relevant to the negation of mens rea.
Particularly, the treatment of mens rea makes the potential
for comparative analysis explicit, as Dubber draws out
parallels between the American and the German approach
to the crucial question of intent, comparing and contrasting
the MPC scheme with the traditional civil law distinction
between various types of dolus and culpa.
At first sight, a German reader must be amazed by the
complexity of the MPC's mens rea provision. As opposed to
Germany, where all mens rea issues are in the hands of the
judiciary, 1° everything is codified in considerable detail."
This seems odd from a German perspective, since it is the
German criminal law system that is strictly code-based, as
supra note 1, at 206-11 (distinguishing between "positive" and "negative"
legality).
10. Section fifteen of the German Penal Code only provides that intent
(Vorsatz) is a necessary prerequisite for criminal liability. See Strafgesetzbuch
[StGB] [Penal Code] § 15.
11. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
20061 239
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opposed to Anglo-American criminal law that still retains
some common law elements.
12
However, one soon finds out that the American mens
rea scheme contains broad similarities with-and some
specific differences from-the different forms of Vorsatz
(intent) in German criminal law. It would be safe to assume
that the MPC's definition of "purpose" is broadly consistent
with the German concept of Absicht (dolus directus one).
Also, the code's definition of "knowledge" broadly resembles
the German legal concept of dolus directus two. 13 On the
other hand, the American concept of recklessness based on
section 2.02(2)(c) of the MPC seems to vary from its
German pendent dolus eventualis (conditional intent) more
than one might expect at first sight. Dubber cites an
interesting example: an injury case where the actor was
aware that something might happen to the victim but was
not certain that it would happen might lead to different
results under German and American mens rea schemes if
the actor hoped that he would not hit another person. 14
Under the German system, Vorsatz (in the form of dolus
eventualis, or conditional intent) clearly would be absent.
Under the MPC, however, the outcome of the case could be
different, depending on the understanding of the code's
requirement of "conscious disregard," a risk in its definition
of recklessness. So it seems from a German perspective that
the concept of recklessness is to be seen somewhere in
between the German concepts of dolus eventualis and
conscious negligence (bewusste Fahrlissigkeit).15
The German scholar Thomas Weigend' 6  already
claimed that the German criminal law system might learn
how to ease the still ongoing and complicated debate of how
to differentiate between intent (Vorsatz) and negligence
12. Note, however, that the United States appears to be well on its way to a
code-based criminal law system as well. Cf. Markus D. Dubber, Reforming
American Penal Law, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 50 (1999) ("The age of
the common penal law is over.").
13. Thomas Weigend, Zwischen Vorsatz und Fahrldssigkeit, 93 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ZStW] 657 (674) (1981) (F.R.G.).
14. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 71.
15. See Weigend, supra note 13, at 674-677.
16. See id. at 687-700.
240 [Vol. 54
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(Fahrlissigkeit)17 by acknowledging a category like the
American standard of recklessness. In Germany, intent in
its form of dolus eventualis requires a court to find out what
the defendant knew (first element of intent) and what he
wanted (second element of intent) when he committed the
crime.' 8 Here, Weigend is absolutely right when he states
that it is a considerable challenge to determine what a
defendant actually wanted somewhere in the past. 19 The
American notion of recklessness would have the advantage
of more closely approaching the psychic reality of the
defendant in the past, since it just asks whether the
defendant disregarded a substantial risk.20 On the other
hand, one should not disregard the fact that adopting a
concept of recklessness in Germany would extend intent
liability far into today's area of negligence and thus lead to
harsher sentencing in certain areas.2 1 So all these points
considered, Weigend's suggestion has several advantages
and disadvantages.
Apart from that, perhaps German criminal law could at
least learn from the MPC's attempt to codify mens rea
issues systematically and in a meaningful way. Yet, the
MPC's very detailed mens rea scheme, which suggests
different forms of mens rea for different offense elements,
might turn out to be a little bit too detailed after all.
Generally speaking, as already stated, it is difficult to
ascertain a perpetrator's thoughts about something he or
she did in the past. Nobody has access to the thoughts of
17. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov 4,
1988, 36 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 1 (9)
(F.R.G.) (so-called Aids Case), as well as WESSELS & BEULKE, supra note 3,
216-229 (35th ed. 2005).
18. See 36 BGHSt 1, supra note 17.
19. See Weigend, supra note 13, at 689.
20. See id.
21. It seems that the expansion of recklessness into what Germans would
call "conscious negligence" (bewusste Fahrldssigkeit) helped the American
scholar Jerome Hall justify his critical suggestion that no punishment of
negligent behavior is needed beyond the punishment of reckless behaviour. Cf.
Jerome Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COL. L. REV. 632 (1963). Hall suggests drawing the line of punishment between
voluntary harm (punishable) and inadvertence (unpunishable), showing at the
same time that behavior involving "gross deviation" or merely thinking of a risk
that finally comes true, may be enough to assume recklessness under the MPC.
See id. at 633, 641.
2006] 241
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other human beings (luckily!). As a result, findings about
intent are always insecure and require a certain amount of
conjecture on the part of the fact finder-a criminal judge
(in Germany) or a jury22 (in the United States). Thus, an
overly differentiated system that puts too much emphasis
on finely grained distinctions among types of mens rea
might further complicate an inquiry that is already
complicated enough.
Similar concerns arise throughout American criminal
law. As described in Dubber's book, American criminal law
generally tends to place great emphasis on subjective
offense elements (mens rea) as opposed to objective
elements (actus reus). Consider, for instance, the MPC's
taxonomy of homicide offenses, which rests largely on
distinctions among types of mens rea, 23 whereas German
criminal law does not specifically focus on the exact form of
mens rea in a given case. 24 Under the murder statute of
section 211 of the German Penal Code, the lowest form of
intent (dolus eventualis) would be sufficient for criminal
liability. Here, the aggravated punishment for murder may
only arise out of special characteristics (Mordmerkmale) of
either the objective act or out of subjective motives of the
actor.25 Similarly, the MPC's theory of justification holds
that it is-contrary to German law2 6 -sufficient for claims
of justification that the actor merely "believes" he is entitled
to the defense.
22. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 123 ("It is not the kind of question that a
jury can readily answer."). Also admitting to such difficulties is Thomas
Weigend, supra note 13, at 695.
23. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 210 (1962).
24. But note, however, that several offenses in the special part of the
German Penal Code require more than dolus eventualis for criminal liability.
See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 258 (requiring dolus directus
one or two).
25. On the Mordmerkmale of section 211 German Penal Code see, for
example, Friedrich C. Schroeder, Grundgedanken der Mordmerkmale, 1984
Juristische Schulung [JuS] 275 (F.R.G.), as well as the new annotations of
Ulfrid Neumann on § 211 of the German Penal Code in NOMOS KOMMENTAR ZUM
STAFGESETZBUCH (Ulfrid Neumann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
26. Under German Criminal Law, the rules of mistake (the so-called
Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum) would apply if the actor merely thinks that he is
entitled to act in self-defense although there is no objective self-defense
situation. See HANS H. JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES
STRAFRECHTS-ALLGEMEINER TEIL 350 (5th ed. 1996).
242 [Vol. 54
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The question of justification is addressed in chapter
three, where Dubber proceeds to the second step in the
three-step analysis, which inquires into the lawfulness of
facially criminal behavior, including necessity (balance of
evils), self-defense, and consent. It turns out that, particu-
larly with respect to the doctrines of necessity and self-
defense, American and German criminal law display some
noteworthy differences.
Under the MPC's doctrinal system of justification,
necessity is the mother of all justifications, introducing the
doctrinal mechanism of balancing evils, which can be found
in each and every claim of justification under the MPC.
Thus, self-defense, consent, et cetera can be considered as
particular instances of balancing evils. Under German
criminal law, by contrast, self-defense27 is said to be the
strongest claim of justification, which should always be
considered first in a case before moving on to other
possibilities of justification. It is also established doctrine
that self-defense does not involve any balancing of evils.
28
Under the self-defense statute of section thirty-two of the
German Penal Code, it is sufficient for somebody to face an
imminent and unlawful attack. This alone is the basis for a
claim of self-defense. A balancing process between the legal
goods of the attacker and the defender is not involved here.
The only "proportionality" that is needed for a claim of self-
defense under section thirty-two of the German Penal Code
is proportionality between the intensity of the attack and
the intensity of the defense. 29 On the other hand, German
criminal law does recognize a necessity defense that turns
on the balancing of evils; 30 however, that defense is not
considered fundamental. It merely constitutes one way to
justify criminal behavior among others and thus reflects the
27. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 32.
28. See, e.g., 72 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt]
58 (1938) (F.R.G.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 9,
2004, 2 Neue Zeitschrift fuir Strafrecht [NStZ] 85 (2004) (F.R.G.);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb 12, 2003, 8 Neue
Zeitschrift ffir Strafrecht [NStZ] 425 (2003) (F.R.G.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] 1982 Strafverteidiger [StV] 219 (F.R.G.).
29. See the detailed and up-to-date explanations of Felix Herzog, in NOMOS
KOMMENTAR ZUM STAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 25, at § 32 63.
30. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 34; see also Birgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] §§ 228, 904.
2006] 243
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fact that balancing evils is not the only underlying
theoretical explanation for the doctrinal rules of justifica-
tion. In German criminal law, each justification will derive
from its own underlying theoretical explanation, such as
the enforcement and protection of the legal system and its
legal rules, the guaranty of liberty, and so on.31
Another important difference between the American
and the German laws of justification concerns one of the
classic problems in the doctrinal rules of justification:
weighing the value of lives. Under German criminal law-
although not explicitly stated in section thirty-four of the
German Penal Code-balancing one human life against
another or others is not permitted. 32 This is one of the most
important rules to keep in mind with regard to the German
necessity defense. Under the MPC's necessity provision the
value of lives are weighed against each other, as the MPC
Commentaries make clear. Dubber uses the famous nine-
teenth century sea cannibalism case of Regina v. Dudley &
Stephens33 to illustrate this point.34 Here, the MPC would
not categorically reject the argument that the necessity
defense might justify killing a boy to save two sailors from
the imminent death of starvation. 35 German literature, on
the other hand, claims that the necessity defense should
never be available to justify a killing of a human being. 36
A comparative perspective might highlight compelling
reasons to reject claims of weighing lives on the ground that
the MPC approach implicates very sensitive matters of
31. See JESCHECK & WEIGEND, supra note 26.
32. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept 15, 1989,
35 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 347 (350)
(F.R.G.); NOMOS KOMMENTAR ZUM STAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 25, at § 34 74;
1 ROXIN, supra note 3, § 16 33-41.
33. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 Q.B 273 (Germans often
refer to this case as the Mignonette Case).
34. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 148.
35. As Dubber points out, however, the MPC Commentaries argue that the
MPC version of the necessity defense would not apply in this particular case,
though for a different reason, namely that the defendants did not establish the
necessity of their facially criminal act, since their death was not sufficiently
likely when they killed the boy.




human existence and bears the risk of abuse.37 Still, the
American approach seems more honest than the German
approach. American criminal law openly recognizes the
possibility of balancing the value of human lives. German
criminal law doctrine, on the other hand, insists on the
basic principle that weighing the value of lives is beyond
the pale, while at the same time, violating this principle in
different areas, proving that a legal system might not be
able to resist such a balancing process. 38 The most
prominent current example in Germany is the so-called "Air
Security Act," which came into force after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. 39 Here (in section fourteen
subsection three), the German legislature explicitly entitles
fighter pilots to shoot and destroy passenger jets full of
innocent people when they are under the control of
hijackers! The planes then constitute an imminent danger
for people on the ground, which could not otherwise be
stopped. The justification of this new piece of legislation is
exactly what is rejected under the law of balancing evils
pursuant to section thirty-four of the German Penal Code:
weighing the value of lives as a matter of necessity. The
German Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has
agreed to consider the constitutionality of the Act.40 In the
37. Arguments of weighing human lives were often used in Nazi Germany to
justify the killings of people. Therefore, the category of lebensunwertes Leben
(unworthy lives) was established. See 1 ROXIN, supra note 3, at § 16 33.
38. See NOMOS KOMMENTAR ZUM STAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 25, at § 34
77. Also, a few German scholars argue for certain exceptions to the basic rule
against balancing lives. See 1 ROXIN, supra note 3, at § 16 35 for a summary
of the discussion.
39. Cf. Wolfram H6fling & Steffen Augsberg, Luftsicherheit, Grundrechtsregime
und Ausnahmezustand, 22 JURISTEN ZEITUNG [JZ] 1080 (2005) (F.R.G.);
Wolfgang Mitch, Luftsicherheitsgesetz-Die Antwort des Rechts auf den 11.
September 2001, 7 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU [JR] 274 (2005) (F.R.G.); Michael
Pawlik, § 14 Abs. 3 des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes-ein Tabubruch?, 21 JURISTEN
ZEITUNG [JZ] 1045 (2004) (F.R.G.); Arndt Sinn, Totung Unschuldiger auf Grund
§ 14 III Luftsicherheitsgesetz-rechtmd/ig?, 11 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 585 (2004) (F.R.G.); Klaus LUiderssen, Krieg gegen den
Terror-Die Logik des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Jan. 18, 2005, at 37.
40. See 1 BvR 357/05 (2006), available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungenrs20060215lbvr035705.html. The constitutional challenge
here is Article One, as well as Article Two of the German Constitution (Basic
Law). Certain plaintiffs claim that their constitutional right to be treated with
dignity as human beings (Article One) and their constitutional right to life
2006] 245
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end, the issue before the court will turn on the very same
basic questions of necessity as a justification that troubled
the English court in Dudley & Stephens over a century
ago. 41
The third, and final, step in the analysis of criminal
liability-responsibility-is discussed in chapter four. Here,
Dubber discusses excuses such as insanity, infancy, duress,
entrapment, and ignorance of law. At this point, too,
general areas of similarity appear alongside points of differ-
ence between American and German criminal law. German
criminal law regards issues of insanity and infancy as
excuses as well. 42 Also, a mistake of law (ignorance of law)
might be treated as an excuse according to section
seventeen of the German Penal Code.
43
Interesting, however, is a very basic difference with
respect to the MPC's approach to entrapment. While the
MPC can be seen as treating entrapment as an excuse,
German criminal law might classify subjective entrapment
as a mistake that might qualify as an excuse but would not
treat objective entrapment under matters regarding culpa-
bility. In German criminal procedure, the discussion around
the so-called agent provocateur addresses the same basic
problem. Here, the judiciary has held that if governmental
entrapment causes one to commit a crime, it is considered
in the sentencing process (Strafzumessungsldsung).44 This
is to say that entrapment in Germany might (only) lead to
(Article Two) are unconstitutionally endangered by this piece of legislation
when entering an airplane. See Das Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de (last visited
Mar. 10, 2006) for details. On these constitutional issues, see the detailed
analysis of Hofling & Augsberg, supra note 39, at 1081-83.
41. During the process of publication of this article the federal constitutional
court reached a final decision holding section fourteen, subsection three of the
Air Security Act unconstitutional. For details, see Das Bundesverfassungsgericht
(Federal Constitutional Court), http://www. bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
42. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §§ 19, 20. See also 1 ROXIN,
supra note 3, at § 20 for details.
43. See id. at § 21. See also NOMOS KOMMENTAR ZUM STAFGESETZBUCH, supra
note 25, at § 17 for details.
44. For the judiciary's point of view see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice] Nov 18, 1999, 45 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Strafsachen [BGHSt] 321 (F.R.G.). For a good overview of the legal discussion
in general, see KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND ZUM
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ § 48 78-79 (Gerd Pfeiffer ed., 5th ed. 2003).
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mitigation of punishment. Some criminal law scholars
argue, however, that entrapment should function as a
complete defense because the government forfeits its right
to punish a citizen when it encourages people to commit a
crime. 45 At least in the case of objective entrapment,
however, which would apply even if the defendant was
predisposed to commit the offense in question, the German
approach might be preferable. It seems that Dubber is not
too far away from such a conclusion when he states that
objective entrapment under the MPC is hardly seen as an
excuse, although codified as one.
46
The book concludes with a useful overview that
summarizes its contents in a flowchart for the analysis of
criminal liability. Relevant sections of the MPC are cited
throughout, once again highlighting the connection between
the doctrinal rules of American criminal law, the MPC, and
German criminal law.
Not only does the structure of Dubber's book resemble
that found in traditional textbooks on German criminal law,
but Dubber's frequent references and comparisons to
German criminal law turn the book into a fruitful resource
for comparative work in the field of criminal law. It will
prove particularly useful to those scholars and students
within the civil law tradition who wish to satisfy their
curiosity-and perhaps even to correct their prejudices-
regarding the current state of American criminal law. For
Anglo-American scholars, with even a rudimentary
understanding of German, it may also serve as an
introduction to some basic German criminal law concepts
that parallel familiar doctrines and encourage further study
in German criminal law.
Future editions of Dubber's book may be enhanced if
the detailed description of American criminal law from the
perspective of the MPC were enriched with additional
normative or even critical remarks presenting the author's
opinion on certain issues. A German audience in particular
might expect such commentary since German textbooks on
general criminal law are usually full of critical remarks or
45. See, for example, the articles of Hans 0. Bruns (228-237), Hans-Jirgen
Bruns (259-284), Kurt Seelmann (285-298), and Jirgen Taschke (305-314) in V-
LEUTE, DIE FALLE IM RECHTSSTAAT (Klaus Luderssen ed., 1985).
46. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 188.
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suggestions for how to proceed in certain cases. So it would
be interesting, from a German perspective, to learn more
about Dubber's position on critical issues such as strict
liability (unknown to German criminal law in this form)
and the widespread use of possession offenses in American
criminal law.47 Also, Dubber might address such problems
as those already discussed with regard to mens rea. When
the reader learns that an injury case might lead to different
results under the mens rea schemes in German and
American criminal law, 48 it would be interesting to have
Dubber evaluate the respective outcomes.
Moreover, certain concepts of substantive criminal law
are difficult to appreciate without a basic knowledge of
criminal procedure. This may pose a problem for a German
reader since the German "inquisitorial" system differs
significantly from the American "adversarial" system. A
discussion of American criminal procedure probably would
exceed the scope of Dubber's book, which already covers
considerable ground in the area of substantive criminal law.
Still, a familiarity with American criminal procedure will be
necessary for anyone who should wish to pursue the issues
raised in Dubber's book in greater detail. Clearly, further
comparative criminal law research would benefit from a
German-language introduction to American criminal proce-
dure. But this needs to be done in another book.
Comparative criminal law is not a new way of thinking.
Even at the beginning of the twentieth century, German
scholars undertook comparative studies of criminal law.
49
But such comparative work needs to be intensified,
47. But note that Dubber has already discussed the above-mentioned
problems in other publications, though in English. See Markus D. Dubber,
Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2002), as well as Markus D. Dubber, Toward a
Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 509 (2004).
48. DUBBER, supra note 8, at 71.
49. Cf. Lutz Eidam, Facilitating a Comparative Analysis of Criminal Law:
Volker Krey's Bilingual Textbook on German Criminal Law, 5 GERMAN L.J.
1171, 1171-72 (2004), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=500.
Robert von Hippel's influential criminal law textbook, first published in 1925,
already contained a chapter on comparative criminal law. In the late nineteenth
century, the leading representative of the progressive school of German
criminal jurisprudence, Franz von Liszt, conducted comparative studies
beginning and, in 1889, founded the "International Criminalist Association"
(Internationale Kriminalistische Vereinigung).
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especially in the long unattended field of criminal law.
Dubber's book makes an important contribution to this
field; hopefully, others will follow its lead.

